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CASE COMMENTS
meaning of "proximate cause" does not exclude substantial but non-
dominant causes, 0 a strict interpretation of the regulations might rea-
sonably lead one to arrive at the "significant" motivation test as that
intended by the draftsmen.
The Court, however, has opted for a decision consistent with its
own earlier holdings. The decision is justifiable since "dominant" mo-
tivation is a more precise test. Perhaps the major importance of the
decision in Generes is not that the Court adopted one test over the
other, but that it did adopt a test by which similar cases can be de-
cided consistently by lower courts in the future.
Joseph S. Beeson
U.C.C. - Statute of Limitations - Conflicts Between Personal
Injury and Sales Contract Statutes of Limitations
In October, 1966, Roy Lee Heavaer purchased a trailer and
eight new Uniroyal truck tires. Mr. Heavner was operating this vehi-
cle in April of the following year when an accident occurred resulting
in damage to the trailer and severe injuries to himself. In September,
1970, Heavner brought an action against Uniroyal, the tire manu-
facturer, and Pullman, the seller of the trailer, asserting that both
were liable for breach of express and implied warranties.' Uniroyal
and Pullman moved to have the personal injury action dismissed on
the grounds it was barred by the two year New Jersey statute of limi-
tations governing personal injury actions. 2 Heavner contended that he
30 Professor Prosser points out that instructions to the jury that they must
find defendant's conduct to be the "sole cause" of the injury in order to give
relief should be and are strongly condemned as improper. Damages may be
apportioned between separate causes according to the degree to which they
contributed to the harm. Although one cause may have been responsible for a
greater degree of injury, each cause is proximate if each alone would have
caused the injury to occur. W. PRossER, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 41-42 (4th
ed. 1971).
1 Heavner also sought relief on the grounds of strict liability in tort, strict
liability for misrepresentation, and negligence.2 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (1952) provides:
"Every action at law for an injury to the person caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of any person within this state shall be commenced
within 2 years next after the cause of any such action shall have accrued."
This is similar to W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie, 1966), which
provides a two year limitation on the commencement of actions to recover for
personal injury but does not require the injury to be the result of the wrongful
act, default, or neglect of another.
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was seeking recovery for breach of express and implied warranty;
hence the four year statute of limitations on Uniform Commercial
Code sales contract actions was applicable.3 The trial court ruled in
favor of the defendants and Heavner appealed. Held, affirmed. 4 The
New Jersey Superior Court employed two lines of reasoning. First,
actions such as this are essentially personal injury actions controlled
by the two year statute of limitations. Although they may arise from
contracts of sale, any difference from other personal injury tort ac-
tions is more fancied than real. Second, the court found no intent on
the part of the legislature to alter the basic two year statute of limita-
tions by adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code. Heavner v. Uni-
royal, Inc., 118 N.J. Super. 116, 286 A.2d 718 (App. Div. 1972).
A conflict between the Uniform Commercial Code's [hereinafter
referred to as the UCC] four year statute of limitations governing all
actions arising out of contracts of sale and the various state statutes
of limitations for personal injury actions has arisen in several jurisdic-
tions. Although the reasoning employed in Heavner has been used in
almost every case,s the results have been widely divergent. Some
courts have applied the UCC four year statute of limitations to all
actions based upon sales contracts, including those that seek damages
for personal injuries. Others have applied the personal injury statute
of limitations to all actions seeking to recover for personal injury
even though some may have arisen out of contracts of sale.
In Heavner the court reasoned that since an action seeking re-
covery for personal injuries brought on the theory of warranty was
no different from any other personal injury action, the statute of lim-
itations should be the same. There are two considerations in this con-
clusion: First, actions against manufacturers in New Jersey are based
on strict liability in tort;6 second, the essence or gravamen of the ac-
tion was the personal injury. Since consumer actions against manu-
facturers in New Jersey are founded on strict liability in tort, this
would indicate that all such actions are identical. Hence the presence
3 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-725(1) (1962) provides:
"An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued." This is identical to
W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 725(1) (Michie 1966).4 This case has been appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court but no
argument date has been set as of this writing.
sApparently only one case has accepted the application of the UCC's
four year statute of limitations to actions seeking recovery for personal injury
as a foregone conclusion. Moody v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 324 F. Supp. 844
(S.D. Ga. 1971).
6 Rosenau v. New Brunswick, 51 N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968).
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of a commercial relationship between the parties would add nothing
to the cause of action to make the two year statute of limitations in-
applicable. In Abate v. Barkers of Wallingford, Inc.,7 a Connecticut
Common Pleas Court incorporated similar reasoning into its decision
and held a four year statute of limitations inapplicable in an action
against the manufacturer of defective ice skates. It noted that a pre-
vious case in that state had relied upon the Restatement (Second) of
Torts" to define the responsibility of the manufacturer to the con-
sumer. The court stated that such actions were better regarded as
founded on strict liability-in tort and not properly within the confines
of the implied warranty sections of the UCC. Therefore the three
year statute of limitations for tort actions was held to apply9 This
reasoning has been severely criticized because, although an action for
breach of warranty may arise from the same set of circumstances as
a tort action, the four year statute of limitations must be applied to
the warranty pleadings in order to achieve the national uniformity
intended by the UCC.'0 This criticism seems justified when one con-
siders that Connecticut law compels an interpretation of the UCC
that will help promote uniformity in the laws of the various juris-
dictions."
The conclusion in Heavner that all personal injury actions are
basically the same was reinforced by the court's consideration of the
essence of the action. There is considerable authority in New Jersey
to support the proposition that any action to recover for personal
injury is, in essence, a personal injury action regardless of the de-
nomination given it by the pleader, or that it may have arisen from
a breach of warranty.'2 This same idea formed the basis of the ruling
in Tyler v. R.R. Street & Co.,'3 where the harm alleged, not the form
727 Conn. Supp. 46, 229 A.2d 366 (C.P. New Haven 1967).
8 R STATEmmNr (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). This section subjects
the seller in certain instances to strict liability and extends that coverage to
ultimate users and consumers.
9 CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577 (1960) provides:
"No action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years
from the date of the act or omission complained of."
1oW. WiLLiER & F. HART, U.C.C. REP. & DiG. 2-693 (1969).
" CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42a-1-102(1),(2)(c) (1960) provide:
"(1) This title shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies."
"(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this title are ... (c) to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions." West Virginia has adopted
this provision. W. VA. Cou ech. 46, art. 1, §§ 102(1),(2) (c) (Michie 1966).
'2 Garfield v. Furniture Fair-Hanover, 113 NJ. Super. 509, 274 A.2d
325 (Law Div. 1971); Raskin v. Shulton, Inc., 92 NJ. Super. 315, 223 A.2d
284 (App. Div. 1966).
13 322 F. Supp. 541 (E.D. Va. 1971). The plaintiff was injured in March
3
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of action, was held to determine which of the various statutes of limi-
tations should apply. The court felt that since cases decided prior to
the UCC had held the two year personal injury statute 4 applicable
to all actions seeking recovery for personal injury, whether based on
contract or tort, the mere adoption of another contract statute of
limitations' s would not vary that application.
The essence of the action to which the courts referred in Heavner
and Tyler is whether the damages sought are for injury to the person.
The New York courts have taken a different approach to this ques-
tion. Bort v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 6 held the essence of warranty
actions against manufacturers is the breach of a special contract that
goods are fit for the purpose sold. Thus such actions are based upon
contracts and the UCC four year statute of limitations on contracts
of sale is applicable whether the damages sought are for injury to the
person or for purely economic loss.
The court in Heavner also based its decision on its interpretation
of the legislative intent manifested by the enactment of the UCC. The
reasoning in this area has generally centered around two points: First,
the actual wording of the later statute insofar as it is inconsistent with
prior law, and second, the basic policy the legislature wished to pro-
mote as extracted from certain code sections and comments. The
first point illustrates a basic rule of statutory construction. Implied
repealers are disfavored by law. Older and more traditional law is not
repealed by implication unless completely irreconcilable with the later
enactment.' Although the presumption against implied repealers was
not explicitly mentioned in Heavner, the court did reason that if the
1967, by the fumes of a product known as "Picrin", which was manufactured
by the defendant. The action was commenced in June 1969. The court rejected
application of the UCC four year statute of limitations and held that the
action was barred by Virginia's two year statute of limitations for personal
injury actions.
'4 VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (1957) provides:
"Every action for personal injuries shall be brought within two years next
after the right to bring the same shall have accrued." This statute is almost
identical to West Virginia's statute of limitations on personal injury actions.
W. VA. CODE ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1966), infra note 40.
15VA. CoDEr ANN. § 8.2-725(1) (1965) provides:
"An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced
within four years after the cause of action has accrued." This is identical to
W. VA. CoDB ch. 46, art. 2, § 725(1) (Michie 1966).
1658 N.Y. Misc. 2d 889, 296 N.Y.S.2d 739 (Syracuse City Ct. 1969).
This line of reasoning was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New
York. Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S. 2d 490 (1969).
17Bradberry v. Buffington, 74 W. Va. 529, 82 S.E. 321 (1914); 1
J. SUTrHMLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.14, at 64 (4th ed. 1972).
[Voel. 75
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legislature had intended to alter the two year statute of limitations it
would have done so expressly as it did with another statute of limita-
tions dealing with contract actions.' 8 Yet, the Supreme Court of Ten-
nessee adopted the four year UCC statute for al actions arising out
of sales contracts.19 It found the UCC irreconcilable with prior law
because it contains a specific statute of limitations for actions based
on contracts of sale20 and includes personal injuries as an element of
damages in such actions.2'
The second point, that legislative intent may be extracted from
the subject matter of the new enactment, is basically an embodiment
of the criticism of the presumption against implied repealers. This
position recognizes that the basic purpose of most new legislation is
to change existing law. Absent express repealers, the extent to which
earlier laws are repealed is determined by the subject matter of the
new enactment.22 Decisions in New York,23 Pennsylvania, 24 and Ohio2s
have apparently adopted the latter position by considering not only
the UCC sections dealing with damages and statutes of limitations,
but also certain introductory sections directing that the UCC be con-
strued liberally to promote "its underlying purposes and policies".
2
The official comment to the statute of limitations section of the UCC
clearly states that one of the section's purposes is to introduce a uni-
form statute of limitations for sales contracts. This purpose is carried
out by removing sales contracts from laws limiting commencement
18 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-1 (Supp. 1971), amending NJ. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:14-1 (1952). The existing six year statute of limitations on express or
implied contracts not under seal was amended to eliminate its applicability to
actions 'for breach of any contract for sale governed by section 12A:2-725
of the New Jersey Statutes." Id. West Virginia has made no such change.
'9 Layman v. Keller Ladders, Inc., 224 Tenn. 396, 455 S.W.2d 594 (1970).20TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-725(1) (1964) provides:
"An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued."
21 TENN. CoDE ANN. § 47-2-715(2) (b) (1964) provides:
"Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach include .. .
injury to person or property proximately resulting from any breach of war-
ranty." This section is identical to W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 715(2) (b)
(Michie 1966).
22 1 J. SrTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 2016, at 472-73 (3d ed.
1943).23 Bort v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 58 N.Y. Misc. 2d 889, 296 N.Y.S.2d
739 (Syracuse City Ct. 1969).
24 Gardiner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 420, 197 A.2d 612
(1964).
25Val Decker Packing Co. v. Corn Prod. Sales Co., 411 F.2d 850 (6th
Cir. 1969) (applying Ohio law).26 N.Y. UCC § 1-102 (McKinney 1964); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1301.02
(1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 1-102 (1954). West Virginia has enacted
the same provision. W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 1, § 102 (Michie 1966).
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of other contract actions and imposing a four year limitations period
"as the most appropriate to modem business practice". 27 Prior to
enactment of the UCC, each of these courts had recognized that the
right sought to be enforced, whether personal or purely economic,
determined which statute of limitations applied. Each felt, however,
that the policy enunciated by the UCC was sufficiently illustrative of
the requisite legislative intent to repeal the pre-existing statutes of
limitations to the extent of their inconsistency with the UCC.
In attempting to resolve the Heavner question, courts have virtu-
ally ignored the basic reasoning underlying the variances between
statutory limitation periods. To answer that question, it may be
helpful to survey the considerations upon which such variances are
based.
The purpose of all statutory limitations is fairness to the defen-
dant, courts, and the public in general, by protecting them from the
disruptive effect of tenuous claims asserted after witnesses and evi-
dence have been lost.2 As a general rule, in order to serve this pur-
pose better, the statutory periods allotted vary with the permanence
of the evidence required to prove liability or extent of damage, or
with the degree of favor or disfavor with which legislative bodies
view particular actions. 29 Since the evidence necessary to prove or
disprove the cause and extent of personal injury generally rests in the
minds of the witnesses, it is better to compel the bringing of such
actions before memories fade or witnesses scatter. This is in contrast
to disputes involving real property or contract rights where either the
subject matter or the written instrument is generally available at
time of trial.36 This rationale was apparently the basis for the original
English statute of limitations, the root of most American statutes, that
provided shorter limitation periods for tort actions.3' These early limi-
tations on personal injury actions were generally shortened during the
Industrial Revolution by legislative bodies favoring unrestricted in-
27N.Y. UCC § 2-725, Comment (McKinney 1964); OHIO R V. CODE
ANN. § 1302.98, Comment (1962); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A § 2-725, Comment
(1954). This comment has been adopted in West Virginia. W. VA. CODE
ch. 46, art. 2, § 725, Comment (Michie 1966).
28 Note, Developments in the Law -Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARv.
L. REv. 1177, 1185-86 (1950).
29 Id.
30 Callahan, Statutes of Limitation -Background, 16 OHIO ST. L.J. 130,
134 (1955).
31 Limitation Act, 21 Jac. I, c. 16 (1623). This act placed a six year
limitation on actions such as debt, detinue, replevin and account. Actions for
trespass, assault, battery, and wounding were limited to four years and actions
on the case for words, two years. Developments, supra note 28, at 1192 n.148.
[Vol. 75
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dustrial growth unhindered by employee claims. This lends credence
to the theory that limitation periods are also effected by legislative
bias, as well as by evidentiary considerations. 2 Of course, one could
infer the upswing of personal injury actions prompted a tightening of
the evidentiary considerations to further guard against tenuous actions.
The proposition that limitation periods vary according to the
nature of evidence needed to prove or disprove liability is subject
to an obvious criticism: Why should the limitation period for libel, a
tort action in which the proof of defendant's act is preserved in the
written word, be shorter than that provided for oral contracts, where
proof of the contract rests solely in the minds of the speakers?33 This
seems little more than a restatement of the Heavner problem of how
to reconcile variances in limitation periods when the action asserted
contains elements of both tort and contract. Consideration of this
critical question has led some to conclude that it cannot be answered.
Those critical of the view that statutory periods vary according
to evidentiary considerations contend that protection from stale claims
is secondary to the dominant purpose of social stability. The obvious
way to prevent any disruptive actions is to forbid all actions. Since
fairness to prospective plaintiffs will not allow this, the ends of social
stability would best be served by a shortening of all limitations to the
point where stability is outweighed by the need for fairness to those
having claims.34 It seems more consistent with the history of statutes
of limitations, however, to consider the variances of periods according
to evidentiary considerations and legislative bias as a means of achiev-
ing the end purpose of stability. That is, we eliminate the disruption
caused by the assertion of claims after the ability to defend has been
lost or diminished.
When one considers the UCC warranty action in relation to the
evidentiary theory, the distinction between evidentiary considerations
of tort and contract becomes blurred since warranty actions contain
characteristics of both. With sales contracts, a great deal of attention
is given to the warranties attaching to purchased goods. Thus wit-
nesses to such a transaction are more likely to give accurate testimony
about the nature of the transaction after a longer period of time than
are witnesses to a negligent act that, by its nature, catches the parties
unaware. This is particularly true in UCC cases since once the buyer
32 Developments, supra note 28, at 1193.
33 Callahan, supra note 30, at 134.
341d. at 138.
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establishes that the seller was a merchant or had reasonable knowl-
edge of buyer's reliance on seller's skill or judgment, the terms of the
warranties are set out either in the sales contract or by statute. 5 Were
this the only proof required for recovery, personal injury warranty
actions would be more analogous to contract evidentiary considera-
tions, and the contract statute should apply. Of course, proof of sale
is not enough. The plaintiff must also prove some injury and show
that it was caused by a defect in the product that violated either an
express or implied warranty. Generally these facts are proved with
evidence much like that on which tort recoveries are based. There-
fore, the evidentiary considerations of personal injury tort actions
are also applicable. Yet, the scale tips decidedly in favor of the con-
tract statute when one considers that the injury resulted from the sale
of a defective product and, more importantly, that evidence necessary
to prove negligence need not be relied on because the duty of care
is set by the terms of the agreement and not by the reasonable man
standard.
Whether one accepts the idea that time variances are based
upon evidentiary considerations or adheres to a view critical of that
stance, it must be acknowledged that the overriding purpose of stat-
utes of limitations is to protect society from the disruption caused by
perpetual liability. This is accomplished by offering prospective de-
fendants the protection of a statutory bar while allowing injured plain-
tiffs a fair opportunity to initiate their actions.36 On both the evidentiary
and societal considerations, the UCC four year statute of limitations
could be considered a compromise. The evidentiary consideration is
relaxed by allowing warranty claims seeking personal injury damages
to be brought up to four years from the date of sale. This may allow
some plaintiffs to recover on unworthy claims because defendant's
evidence has been lost or witnesses have scattered. Conversely, some
meritorious warranty claims will be barred because the statute runs
four years from the date of sale irrespective of when the injury
occurs. 37
35W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 2, §§ 312-14 (Michie 1966).
36 Callahan, supra note 30, at 138-39.
37 Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
The defective product was delivered in May 1965, and the injury occurred
in October 1969. The statute was held to have run in May 1969, four years
after the delivery of the product. See also Howard v. United Fuel Gas Co.,
248 F. Supp. 527 (S.D. W. Va. 1965). A gas pipe was installed sometime in
1953 and the injury that resulted from the pipe's alleged defectiveness oc-
curred in 1963. The action was commenced in 1964, seeking recovery for
personal injuries on theories of negligence and implied warranty. The implied
warranty counts were held barred by the five year statute of limitations on
[Vol. 75
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Application of Heavner in West Virginia is a matter of specula-
tion since no cases have decided the question presented.38 In Jones v.
Jones," the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals stated the pre-
vailing rule governing the application of statutes of limitations is
that the period of time allotted varies to the nature of the right of
action. The court distinguished property rights from purely personal
rights, such as personal injury. The court did not, however, reduce its
denomination of actions into classes of tort and contract. The same
is true of the West Virginia statute of limitations. It is not limited to
actions in tort, but rather applies to all actions seeking damages for
personal injury.40 Thus it is unclear whether the statute merely en-
compasses tort evidentiary considerations, in which case the contract
statute could be applied, or whether the shorter statute is motivated
primarily by the unsatisfactory nature of the evidence needed to prove
personal injury, in which case the court should follow Heavner.4'
Should the West Virginia court care to justify application of the four
year statute of limitations to personal injury warranty actions it
contracts not in writing. W. VA. CoDE oh. 55, art. 2, § 6 (Michie 1966). This
case applied pre-UCC principles and dealt briefly with the applicability of the
contract statute of limitations to the personal injury aspects of the action.
However, the application of the pre-UCC contract statute of limitations to
bar a personal injury action even before the injury occurred gives some indi-
cation that the code contract statute of limitations may be applied to personal
injury warranty actions in West Virginia.38 This conflict may arise since West Virginia has enacted the UCC four
year contract statute of limitations and the section making personal injuries
an element of damages in actions on sales contracts. W. VA. CODE ch. 46,
art. 2, §§ 715, 725 (Michie 1966). An early West Virginia case held that
either assumpsit or case was appropriate in a personal injury action against a
physician and that in either instance the personal injury statute of limitations
would apply. However, the warranty breached there was one of due care,
making the action identical to a negligence action and subject to the same
considerations. Kuhn v. Brownfield, 34 W. Va. 252, 12 S.E. 519 (1890).
39 133 W. Va. 306, 58 S.E.2d 857 (1949). Plaintiff was injured in Oc-
tober 1946, and this action was commenced in August 1948. The statute of
limitations in effect at that time provided for a one year period to commence
actions that would not survive at common law (basically personal injury
actions). The trial court held that this action was barred by the one year
statute of limitations and the plaintiff appealed. He contended that a revival
statute, which allowed personal representatives of parties to a personal injury
action to sue and be sued, actually made all personal injury actions survivable,
and therefore subject to a longer limitations period. The court rejected this
contention. Actions that survived the death of the parties were actions for
recovery of property or some damage to the estate; purely personal actions
did not survive. Since this action was purely personal, the court rejected a
construction of the survival statute that would subject the action to a longer
statute of limitations.
40W. VA. CoDE ch. 55, art. 2, § 12 (Michie 1966) provides: "Every
personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought
.. within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued
if it be for damages for personal injuries ... :'
41 Developments, supra note 28, at 1194-95.
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could do so with authority. The introductory section and official com-
ment to the UCC, relied upon by the courts that have held in favor
of the four year statute, have been enacted in West Virginia.4 Never-
theless, in view of the statement in Jones, 43 it is clear the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals has authority for rejection of any com-
promise on evidentiary considerations.
Rejection of the four year UCC limitation period in West Vir-
ginia would impose a burden on the business community of defending
warranty claims long after the dates of sale. This imposition would
be balanced, however, by the plaintiffs equally heavy burden of
proving that a defect existed in the product while it was still within the
control of the manufacturer and that the product's failure to meet
commercial expectations was not the result of extended usage.
44
Adoption of the UCC statute would mean that all warranty actions
would be barred four years from the date of tender of delivery, regard-
less of when injury occurs. 4 This would relieve the manufacturer from
the burden of defending against such claims long after the date of
sale, but in turn would sacrifice those valid warranty claims that may
result from injuries incurred more than four years after delivery.
46
The only apparent alternative is the adoption of the four year statute
of limitations that begins to run when the defect is or reasonably
should be discovered. The UCC, however, clearly states that war-
ranty actions accrue on the date of tender of delivery.
47
West Virginia should consider the alternatives carefully. While
analysis of cases indicates that nationwide business firms are con-
cerned only with the statute of limitations most favorable to them in
each particular case,48 the establishment of a uniform national statute
of limitations on sales contract actions seems to be a worthwhile con-
sideration. Adoption of the four year statute of limitations in a state
42 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 1, § 102 (Michie 1966); W. VA. CODE ch. 46,
art. 2, § 725, Comment (Michie 1966).
43 133 W. VA. 306, 308-09, 58 S.E.2d 857, 858 (1949).
44 Note, Manufacturer's Strict Tort Liability to Consumers for Economic
Loss, 41 ST. JOHNs L. REv. 401, 411 (1967).45 Hoffman v. A.B. Chance Co., 339 F. Supp. 1385 (M.D. Pa. 1972).
46 Mendel v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 25 N.Y.2d 340, 253 N.E.2d 207,
305 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1969).47 UCC § 2-725(2) (1962 Official draft) provides: "A cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of
knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of de-
livery is made . .. ."
48 Compare Bort v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 58 N.Y. Misc. 2d 889, 296
N.Y.S.2d 739 (Syracuse City Ct. 1969) (Sears argued in favor of the two
year limitation), with Moody v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 324 F. Supp. 844
(S.D. Ga. 1971) (Sears argued in favor of the four year limitation).
[Vol. 75
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that has not extended strict liability to products liability actions49
would assure those persons doing business in such state that all
actions arising from the sale of a particular product, and commenced
more than four years after tender of delivery, would necessarily be
based upon negligence.
Harvey D. Peyton
49 Strict liability for product related personal injuries has not been adopted
in West Virginia. Cady, Law of Products Liability in West Virginia, 74 W.
VA. L. REv. 283, 301 (1972).
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